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Abstract
We extend Fujiwara’s (2008) model to describe a diﬀerential oligopoly game
of resource extraction under static, linear feedback and nonlinear feedback
strategies, generalising his result that steady state feedback outputs are lower
than monopoly and static oligopoly equilibrium outputs for any number of
ﬁrms. Additionally, we show that (i) feedback rules entail resource exhaustion
for a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms; and (ii) feedback strategies are more aggressive
than static ones as long as the resource stock is large enough, in accordance
with the acquired view based on the traditional pre-emption argument asso-
ciated with feedback information.
JEL codes: C73, L13, Q2
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1 Introduction
The analysis of dynamic market interplay through diﬀerential games has re-
vealed - among other things - that feedback information boosts strategic
interaction among ﬁrms as compared to open-loop information, triggering a
pre-emption mechanism leading ﬁrms to expand production (for an overview,
see Dockner et al., 2000, ch. 10). Fujiwara (2008), relying on Benchekroun
(2003, 2008), proposes a dynamic game of duopolistic extraction of a renew-
able resource, where at equilibrium output levels are lower under linear and
nonlinear feedback information than under monopoly and the static oligopoly
equilibria. We revisit his model allowing for the presence of n ﬁrms, to il-
lustrate that his result that linear and nonlinear feedback equilibria are less
competitive than monopoly and static oligopoly equilibria extend to the gen-
eral case of an oligopoly with n ﬁrms.1 This, however, implies that feedback
information causes the exhaustion of the resource at the steady state for a
ﬁnite number of ﬁrms (in correspondence of which equilibrium proﬁts also
drop to zero). This leads us to the main focus of our note, as the puzzling
aspect of these results is that, taken together, they seem to imply that a less
aggressive behavior goes along with exhaustion. The explanation lies in the
fact that Fujiwara’s appraisal is valid in steady state, but not at any generic
instant during the game. Indeed, using the per-ﬁrm optimal output deﬁned
for a generic resource volume at a generic instant before doomsday, we show
1The extension to the case of n ﬁrms is mentioned in Fujiwara (2008, fn. 8, p. 219) while
it is investigated in Benchekroun (2008) and Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013). The latter
paper, in particular, focusses on the consequences of an ex ante resource parcelization
among a population of ﬁrms. Fujiwara (2011) investigates the welfare eﬀects of increas-
ing the number of ﬁrms when these are characterised by diﬀerent levels of technological
eﬃciency.
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that, as long as the amount of the resource is large enough, the traditional
wisdom applies and output levels are larger under feedback rules, respecting
the intuition behind the standard pre-emption argument. To illustrate this
fact, we explicitly identify the critical threshold of the resource stock below
which Fujiwara’s conclusion holds true. Finally, we also illustrate the pres-
ence of a voracity eﬀect operating for suﬃciently high levels of the resource
growth rate, whereby higher growth rates lead to lower steady state resource
stocks.
2 The model
Consider a diﬀerential oligopoly game of resource extraction over time t ∈
[0,∞) . The industry consists of an n ﬁrms producing a homogeneous good,
whose inverse demand function is p = a−Q at any time t, with Q =
n
i=1 qi.
Marginal cost c ∈ (0, a) is constant and common to all ﬁrms, which operate
without any ﬁxed costs. During production, each ﬁrm exploits a renewable
natural resource, whose accumulation is governed by the following dynamics:
·
S = kS −Q (1)
where S is the resource stock and k > 0 is its natural growth rate. If
ﬁrms don’t internalise the consequences of their behaviour at any time and
play the individual (static) Cournot-Nash output qCN = (a− c) / (n+ 1) at
all times, whereby the residual amount of the natural resource in steady
state is SCN = n (a− c) / [k (n+ 1)] = QCN/k. For future reference, it is
worth noting that the static solution corresponds to the open-loop steady
state one, which in this game is unstable (see Figure 1 in Fujiwara, 2008,
p. 218; and Lambertini, 2013, p. 240).The initial condition is S (0) = S0 >
2
n (a− c) / [k (n+ 1)] , which suﬃcies to guarantees S > 0 at all times under
the static Cournot-Nash strategies.2
3 Feedback Nash equilibria
Following Fujiwara (2008), we consider both linear feedback strategies à la
Benchekroun (2003) and non linear strategies à la Tsutsui and Mino (1990)
and Shimomura (1991). We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation writes as:
rVi (S) = max
qi
{[a− c−Q]qi + V
′ (S) [kS −Q]qi} (2)
where r > 0 is the discount rate, common to all ﬁrms and constant over time;
Vi (S) is the ﬁrm i’s value function; and V
′ (S) = ∂V (S) /∂S. The ﬁrst order
condition (FOC) on qi is
a− c− 2qi −

j =i
qj − V
′ (S) = 0 (3)
In view of the ex ante symmetry across ﬁrms, we impose qj = qi = q (S)
and solve the FOC (3) to obtain V ′(S) = a− c− (n+ 1)q (S) . Substituting
this into (2) yields an identity in S. Diﬀerentiating both sides with respect
to S and rearranging terms, any feedback strategy is implicitly given by the
following diﬀerential equation:
q′(S) =
(k − r) [(n+ 1)q(S)− (a− c)]
2n2q(S)− k(n+ 1)S − (n− 1)(a− c)
, (4)
2To see this, just observe that if ﬁrms always play à la Cournot, the stock at a generic
t is
S (t) =
n (a− c) + ekt [k (n+ 1)S0 − n (a− c)]
k (n+ 1)
which is surely positive if the above condition holds.
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which must hold together with terminal condition limt→∞e
−rtV (s). From
Fujiwara (2008, p. 218), we borrow the assumption k > 5r/2, which amounts
to requiring that the rate of reproduction of the natural resource be high
enough to ensure the non negativity of steady state equilibrium magnitudes
with n ≥ 2. In general, to ensure non-negativity for any number of ﬁrms,one
should assume k > (n2 + 1) r/2, as in Benchekroun (2008, p. 240). The
more restrictive assumption we are adopting is interesting for reasons that
will become clear in the remainder.
3.1 Linear feedback strategy
If the strategy is linear in S, so that q(S) = αS + β, equation (4) becomes:
α =
(k − r) [(n+ 1)(αS + β)− (a− c)]
2n2(αS + β)− (n+ 1)kS − (n− 1)(a− c)
(5)
which is satisﬁed iﬀ
(k − r) [a− c− β (n+ 1)] + α

2βn2 − (a− c) (n− 1)

+α

r (n+ 1)− 2

k (n+ 1)− αn2

S = 0. (6)
The above equation gives rise to the following system of two equations
α [r (n+ 1)− 2 (k (n+ 1)− αn2)] = 0
(k − r) [a− c− β (n+ 1)] + α [2βn2 − (a− c) (n− 1)] = 0
(7)
to be solved w.r.t. the unknown parameters {α, β} . The pairs solving (7)
are (α = 0;β = (a− c) / (n+ 1)) , which replicates the static Cournot-Nash
solution qCN , and
α =
(n+ 1) (2k − r)
2n2
; β = −
(a− c) [2k − r (n2 + 1)]
2k (n+ 1)n2
. (8)
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In correspondence of (8), the individual output is
qNLF (S) =
k (2k − r) (n+ 1)2 S − (a− c) [2k − r (n2 + 1)]
2k (n+ 1)n2
(9)
where superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium while subscript LF stands
for linear feedback. Leaving aside for brevity the replication of the stability
analysis carried out by Fujiwara (2008, p. 218), we focus on (9). If Q∗LF =
nq∗LF , the steady state amount of resource solving
·
S = 0 is (henceforth,
starred values indicate steady state equilibrium magnitudes):
S∗LF =
nq∗LF
k
=
(a− c) [2k − r (n2 + 1)]
k [2k − r (n+ 1)] (n+ 1)
(10)
which is non-negative for all k > r (n2 + 1) /2, the latter condition coinciding
with the assumption k > 5r/2 made by Fujiwara if n = 2. It is then easily
veriﬁed that
∂Q∗LF
∂n
= −
2 (a− c) (k − r) [2k + r (n2 − 1)]
(n+ 1)2 [2k − r (n+ 1)]2
< 0 (11)
for all n ≥ 1. However, it is also true that S∗LF = Q
∗
LF = 0 for all n ≥
(2k − r) /r > 2 (under the above assumption).
3.2 Nonlinear feedback strategy
The case of nonlinear feedback strategies can be quickly dealt with. One
imposes stationarity on the state equation, obtaining q = kS/n, whereby (4)
becomes:
k
n
=
(k − r) [k(n+ 1)S + n(a− c)]
n (n− 1) (a− c− kS)
, (12)
from which one obtains
S∗NLF =
(a− c) (k − nr)
k [2k − r (n+ 1)]
=
nq∗NLF
k
(13)
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with ∂S∗NLF/∂n ∝ ∂Q
∗
NLF/∂n < 0 for all n ≥ 1, and S
∗
NLF = Q
∗
NLF = 0 for
all n ≥ k/r >

(2k − r) /r.3
The foregoing analysis can be summarised in
Lemma 1 Under both linear and nonlinear feedback strategies, the steady
state industry output is everywhere decreasing in the number of ﬁrms. How-
ever, so is also the steady state equilibrium resource stock, and both magni-
tudes drop to zero in correspondence of a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, which is
increasing in the resource growth rate and decreasing in the discount rate.
This generalises Fujiwara’s conclusion to the general case of an oligopoly
with n ﬁrms, making explicit an observation that can be found in Fujiwara
(2008, fn. 8, p. 219) as to the fact that increasing the number of ﬁrms
reduces aggregate extraction and output. However, may we really draw the
implication that under feedback rules oligopolistic interaction is indeed less
competitive than monopoly or static oligopoly? This question, which is a
tricky one in connection with the exhaustion issue, is addressed in the next
section.
3.3 Comparing equilibria
We are now in a position to comparatively assess ﬁrms’ behaviour and its
consequences across the three equilibria considered above. This exercise can
be carried out graphically as in Figure 1, in the space {n,Q} , in which the
curves representing the three possible aggregate outputs depart from the
monopoly quantity qM = (a− c) /2.
3The initial amount of resource must be lower than S∗
NLF
in order for q∗
NLF
to be an
equilibrium strategy (see Itaya and Shimomura, 2001; Rubio and Casino, 202).
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Figure 1 Equilibrium industry output and structure


n
0
Q
QCN
Q∗NLF
Q∗LF
a− c
a− c
2
k/r

(2k − r)/r
Given the ﬁxed proportion between S and Q, immediate implications can
be drawn on the resource stock. Since the assumption k > 5r/2 is equivalent
to

(2k − r) /r > 2, Figure 1 illustrates the following:
Proposition 2 Feedback information leads to the exhaustion of the resource
at the steady state for a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, increasing in k and decreasing
in r. Conversely, the residual resource stock at the static Cournot equilibrium
is positive and increasing in n.
It is worth noting that resource exhaustion, being accompanied by nil
output levels, implies that steady state proﬁts are also zero in correspondence
of a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, while the annihilation of proﬁts at the static
equilibrium takes place only in the limit as n tends to inﬁnity and the industry
becomes perfectly competitive.
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From the existing literature (see Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; Reynolds,
1987, 1991; and Cellini and Lambertini, 2004, inter alia), we are accustomed
to think that feedback information intensiﬁes strategic interaction among
ﬁrms, which translates into larger outputs due to the incentive to pre-empt
rivals generated by feedback rules themselves. How can we reconcile this
acquired wisdom with the seemingly opposite picture emerging from Propo-
sition 2? That is, to what extent it is true that feedback strategies are less
competitive than monopolistic behaviour and, a fortiori, static Cournot-Nash
strategies?
To answer these questions, observe that the diﬀerence
qNLF (S)− q
CN =
(2k − r)

k (n+ 1)2 S − (a− c) (n2 + 1)

2k (n+ 1)n2
> 0 (14)
for all
S >
(a− c) (n2 + 1)
k (n+ 1)2
≡ S, (15)
with S > S∗LF for all k > (n+ 1) r/2, which simpliﬁes to k > 5r/2 if n = 2.
This reveals that, as long as the resource stock is larger than the threshold
S, linear feedback strategies are indeed more aggressive than static Cournot
ones. As soon as S drops below S, the opposite applies throughout the
continuation of the game, up to the steady state, where indeed the result
portrayed in Proposition 2 and Figure 1 appears.
The last step consists in verifying whether, during the game, QNLF (S) =
nqNLF (S) > qM in an admissible range of S. It turns out that this holds true
for all
S > S ≡ (a− c) [k (2 + n (n+ 1))− (n2 + 1) r]
k (2k − r) (n+ 1)2
(16)
with S ∈ S∗LF , S for all admissible values of parameters. Hence, at any
instant in which S > S, following linear feedback rules the oligopoly extracts
and sells more than a monopolist. Thus, our analysis can be summarised in
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Proposition 3 Consider a generic instant t ∈ [0,∞) . If, at time t, S > S,
then QNLF (S) > nq
CN for all n ≥ 1. If instead S ∈
	S, S
 , then QNLF (S) ∈
qM , nq
CN

. Finally, if S < S, then QNLF (S) < qM .
Proposition 3 tells that the intensity of aggregate production (or resource
extraction) at a generic point in time before the steady state is reached is
decreasing in the existing stock of resource, falling below the monopoly level
if the stock falls below a well deﬁned threshold. Put it diﬀerently, the steady
state picture does not encompass the behaviour of the industry while the
game is still unraveling.
4 Voracity eﬀect
Our exercise is also connected with the so-called voracity eﬀect ﬁrst explored
in Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) and then investigated
by Benchekroun (2008, pp. 245-48) using the same resource extraction game
we have adopted here. In a nutshell, the voracity eﬀect says that the a
priori intuition suggesting that the higher is the resource growth rate, the
higher should be the steady state volume of that resource, in fact may not
be correct. This happens because a higher reproduction rate drives ﬁrms to
hasten extraction, as indeed illustrated by (14-15) above. In this regard, we
brieﬂy complement the above analysis by looking at the comparative statics
properties of the steady state levels of S in the three cases under examination:
∂SCN
∂k
= −
n (a− c)
(n+ 1) k2
< 0 everywhere
∂S∗LF
∂k
= −
(a− c) [(n+ 1) (n2 + 1) r2 + 4k (k − (n2 + 1) r)]
(n+ 1) [2k − r (n+ 1)]2 k2
< 0∀k > k
∂S∗NLF
∂k
= −
(a− c) [n (n+ 1) r2 + 2k (k − 2nr)]
[2k − (n+ 1) r]2 k2
< 0∀k > k
(17)
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with k = r
2

n2 + 1 +

(n2 + 1) (2 + n (n+ 1))

k = r n+n (3n+ 1)
2

(18)
and k > maxk, (n2 + 1) r/2 . It is also easily ascertained that k and k are
increasing and convex in n. This allows us to formulate our ﬁnal result:
Proposition 4 k > k suﬃces to ensure that the steady state resource stock
be decreasing in the growth rate, irrespective of the structure of information
underlying ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies. Under feedback rules, increasing the
number of ﬁrms makes the appearance of voracity progressively less likely.
5 Concluding remarks
Revisiting the dynamic game of renewable resource extraction by Benchekroun
(2008) and Fujiwara (2009), we have singled out a feature that has been pre-
viously overlooked, namely, that feedback strategies, although appearing less
aggressive than static ones in steady state, indeed imply a higher pressure on
the resource on the part of ﬁrms, whereby the steady state stock may indeed
be driven to zero at equilibrium for a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. This can be
explained on the basis of a pre-emtpion incentive operating during the game,
accompanied by a voracity eﬀect if the growth rate of the resource is high
enough.
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